Are auditors independent of their clients? A review of past research and discussion of research opportunities in Europe by Livne, G
Are auditors independent of 
their clients? A review of past 
research and discussion of 
research opportunities in 
Europe
Presentation to the Accounting Faculty 
Coller School of Management
Tel Aviv University
Outline
• Overview of research questions archival auditing researchers have 
been interested in
• Defining auditor independence
• Selective literature review on auditor independence and economic 
bonding
• Overview of the (changing) auditing landscape in Europe
• Discussion of certain European-centric studies
• Suggestions for future research    
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Inputs:
• Auditor independence
• Effort
• Expertise and knowledge
• Client co-operation and internal  
systems
• Reputation 
Outputs:
• Auditor opinion
• Auditor report
• Financial statements (reporting 
quality)
The Real Domain
The Research Domain
Independent variables:
• Fees (audit and non audit)
• Audit hours
• Industry expertise
• Auditor size
• Tenure; rotations; joint auditors
• Institutional factors
Dependent (outcome) variables:
• Auditor opinion (clean, qualified, 
GC)
• Auditor report (e.g., content)
• Measures of reporting quality
• Regulatory/enforcement 
outcomes
Audit quality
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Audit Quality
• Hard to observe
• Difficult to quantify
• Difficult to define
• DeFond and Zhang (2014): “We define audit quality as greater assurance of high 
reporting quality”
• Need to operationalize high reporting quality
• DeAngelo (1981): “the market-assessed joint probability that a given auditor will 
both detect a breach in the client’s information system, and report the breach”
• Narrow definition of auditors’ work? 
• Audit quality and independence are intertwined: “The supply of audit quality is 
affected by auditor incentives for independence,” (DeFond and Zhang, 2014)
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Definitions of Independence (1)
• American Institute of Certified Public Accountants (AICPA), “[t]he 
auditor must maintain independence in mental attitude in all matters 
relating to the audit” 
• The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): “[a]n auditor is not 
independent if a reasonable investor, with knowledge of all relevant 
facts and circumstances, would conclude that the auditor is not 
capable of exercising objective and impartial judgment” 
• FRC (UK): “Independence is freedom from situations and relationships 
which make it probable that a reasonable and informed third party 
would conclude that objectivity either is impaired or could be 
impaired. Independence is related to and underpins objectivity.”
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Definitions of Independence (2)
• International Ethics Standards Board for Accountants (IESBA) code: 
Independence is:
• Independence of mind - the state of mind that permits the expression of a 
conclusion without being affected by influences that compromise professional 
judgment, thereby allowing an individual to act with integrity, and exercise 
objectivity and professional skepticism.
• Independence in appearance - the avoidance of facts and circumstances that 
are so significant that a reasonable and informed third party would be likely 
to conclude, weighing all the specific facts and circumstances, that a firm's, or 
a member of the audit or assurance team's, integrity, objectivity or 
professional skepticism has been compromised.
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Economic Bonding
• Client managers pay the fees
• In the US following SOX this responsibility rests with the audit committee (but 
is the committee free of CEO influence?) 
• The “bribe” perspective: These fees can be used to influence auditor 
judgement; hence higher fees capture economic bond 
• Short of the threat of dismissal which can send a negative signal to investors
• Non-audit fees may be the main channel
• The effort perspective: higher fees are paid when the auditor exerts 
more effort
• For example, when task complexity is greater
• The “something else” perspective: e.g., client risk , litigation risk 
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Fee-based Measures
• Audit fees (typically log of)
• Non-audit fees (typically log of)
• Total fees (typically log of)
• Abnormal fee measures
• Based on the residual from a regression model for normal fees (see next slide)
• Despite best modelling effort, some question whether the residual represents 
economic bonding 
• Fee ratios, such as non audit fee/(audit fee + non audit fees)
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A Typical Fee Model
• Need to account for factors known to affect the fee measure
• Since many such factors have been identified, the model can become 
“rich”:
𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿= 𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽1𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽2𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽3𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽4𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽5𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿+ 𝛽𝛽6𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽7𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽8𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴 + 𝛽𝛽9𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽10𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽11𝐷𝐷𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹+ 𝛽𝛽12𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽13𝑀𝑀𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽14𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐿𝐿𝑆𝑆 + 𝛽𝛽15𝑀𝑀𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽16𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝑅𝑅+ 𝛽𝛽17𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹 + 𝛽𝛽18𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷_𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽19𝐿𝐿𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿 + 𝛽𝛽20𝐷𝐷𝐹𝐹𝐿𝐿𝐷𝐷 + 𝛽𝛽21𝐹𝐹𝑀𝑀𝐸𝐸𝐿𝐿+ 𝛽𝛽22𝐿𝐿𝐸𝐸𝐹𝐹𝐷𝐷 + 𝜀𝜀
9
Residual represents abnormal fee
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Study Sample properties: 
period (P), sample size 
(S) and jurisdiction (J)
Fee measure(s) Outcome measure(s) Main findings and 
conclusions
Craswell, A., D.J. Stokes, 
and J. Laughton. 2002. JAE
P: 1994 & 1996
S: 1,062 & 1,045
J: Australia
(1) ratio of client audit 
fees to audit firm’s total 
national audit plus
non-audit fees
(2) ratio of client audit 
fees to audit firm’s total 
office audit plus non-
audit fees
Propensity to issue 
qualified opinion
Fees are not associated 
with the occurrence of 
qualified opinions => 
economic bond does not 
distort auditor incentives
DeFond, M., K. 
Raghunandan, and K.R. 
Subramanyam. 2002. JAR
P: 2000
S: 1,158 financially 
distressed firms
J: USA
(1) Unexpected fee ratio 
(non-audit/total fee)
(2) Unexpected audit fee
(3) Unexpected total fee
(4) Unexpected non-audit 
fee
Propensity to first time 
issue Going Concern (GC) 
opinion
Fees are not associated 
with the occurrence of 
GC  opinions => economic 
bond does not distort 
auditor incentives
Blay, A. D., & Geiger, M. A. 
2013. CAR
P: 2004-2006
S: 1,479 financially 
distressed firms
J: USA (post-SOX)
(1) Future total fees
(2) Current non-audit 
fees
(3) Current audit fees
(4) Current (non-audit 
fees/total fees)
Propensity to first time 
issue Going Concern (GC) 
opinion
Current and future non-
audit fees reduce the 
occurrence of GC  
opinions => economic 
bond does distort auditor 
incentives
Fees and Opinions
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Discussion: Blay and Geiger (2013)
A rich logistic model:
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Discussion: Blay and Geiger (2013)
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• Audit fees do not seem to constitute a bribe, but not clear if they represent audit effort either
• The negative coefficient on NAS and FEERATIO (NAS/Total Fees) is consistent with “bribe”, but what is the 
economic significance?
• Note the significant result on future fees: the auditor is rewarded in the future if they “compromise” today 
• Results are somewhat counter-intuitive: Wouldn’t we expect auditors in distressed firms to be less 
amenable to economic bond as legal threat and reputation risk are stronger? 
• Perhaps auditors in distressed firms are asked to do lots of non-audit work (tax related?)
• Short period (2004-06) – is it representative of the post-SOX experience as a whole? 
Study Sample properties: 
period (P), sample 
size (S) and 
jurisdiction (J)
Main variable(s) of 
interest
Outcome measure(s) Main findings and 
conclusions
Frankel., R., M. Johnson, 
and K. Nelson. 2002 TAR
P: 2000
S: 3,074
J: USA
(1) Non-audit/total fee
(2) Rank of non-audit 
fees
(3) Rank total fees
(1) Prob (earnings surprise = the 
difference between actual
EPS and the last available consensus 
median forecast)
(2) Probability of meeting or just beating 
analyst forecasts by 1 cent
(3) Discretionary accruals
Non audit fees are 
associated with earnings 
management (EM) but audit 
fees are negatively related to 
EM 
Ashbaugh, H., R. LaFond, and 
B.W. Mayhew. 2003 TAR
P: 2000
S: 3,170   
J: USA
(1) Audit fee
(2) Non-audit fee
(3) Total fee
(4) Non-audit/total fee
(1) Same first two measures as in Frankel 
et al. 2002.
(2) Performance adjusted accruals
Non audit fees are not 
associated with EM; mixed 
evidence about audit fees 
and EM
Gul, F.A., C.J.P, Chen and J.S.L. 
Tsui. 2003 CAR
P: 1993
S: 648 firms
J: Australia 
(1) Abnormal accruals (1) Total audit fees
Note the reversal of dependent and 
independent variables 
Positive abnormal accruals 
are associated with higher 
audit fee. Consistent with  
aggressive EM is 
“acceptable” when clients 
pay large fees
Fees and Reporting Quality
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Study Sample properties: 
period (P), sample 
size (S) and 
jurisdiction (J)
Main variable(s) of interest Outcome measure(s) Main findings and 
conclusions
Larcker, D.F., and S.A. 
Richardson. 2004. JAR
P: 2000-2002
S: 5,103 
J: USA
(1) Non-audit/total fee paid by 
client
(2) Total fee paid by client to the 
auditor/total auditor-level revenue 
(1) Abnormal accruals 
(signed and absolute)
Fee ratios are negatively 
related to EM. This is 
inconsistent with economic 
bonding
Causholli, M., D.J. Chambers, 
and J.L. Payne. 2014 CAR
P: 2002-2003 (pre-
SOX) & 2005-2007 
(post-SOX)
S: 4,078 & 4,985
J: USA
(1) Low NAS fee indicator 
(representing potential growth 
opportunity for NAS)
(2) Actual change in NAS fee in t+1
(3) Interaction between (1) and (2)
(1) Abnormal current 
accruals (signed and 
absolute) 
Pre-SOX: The “promise” of 
more NAS work impairs 
independence, as is seen 
from the positive sign on the 
interaction term.
Post-SOX: No relation
Fees and Reporting Quality
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Discussion: Causholli et al. (2014)
• Expand on the idea that auditor “co-operation” in the current period 
buys them higher fees in the future
• Examine fees at the same city and industry in an attempt to capture 
partner-level fees (partner identity is unknown in the US)
Main variables:
OPFEE = Fee growth opportunity; essentially an indicator for currently 
low fees
NY_PCT = Realized change in non-audit fees
OPFEE*NY_PCT = Cases where there was potential to grow fees and 
this has materialized
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Discussion: Causholli et al. (2014)
• Investigate the relation between abnormal accruals and these 
measures
• Abnormal accruals:
• Regression model:
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Discussion: Causholli et al. (2014)
Pre-SOX (2000-2001) Post-SOX (2005-07)
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Discussion: Causholli et al. (2014)
• The authors focus on the positive coefficient on the interaction term 
OPFEE*NY_PCT
• But the negative coefficient on either OPFEE or NY_PCT is baffling. 
The authors simply say: “This result is consistent with the view that 
NAS do not always negatively influence audit quality.”
• The use of one abnormal accrual model is also questionable
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Study Sample properties: 
period (P), sample 
size (S) and 
jurisdiction (J)
Tenure measure(s) Outcome measure(s) Main findings and 
conclusions
Johnson, E., I. Johnson, I.K. 
Khurana, and J.K. Reynolds. 
2002 CAR
P: 1986-1995
S: 2,463 
J: USA
(1) Short-tenure: 2-3 
years
(2) Medium tenure: 4-8
(3) Long tenure: 9 and 
over years 
(1) Absolute abnormal accruals (from 
the modifies Jones model)
(2) Persistence of the accrual 
component in earnings (the
coefficient on current CFO in a 
regression of future earnings)
(1) Strong association of 
short tenure with abs. 
abnormal accruals for 
short tenure
(2) Weaker persistence for 
short tenure
Early years are more prone 
to audit errors
Geiger, M.A., and K. 
Raghunandan. 2002 AJPT
P: 1996-1998
S: 117 bankrupt firms 
J: USA
Natural log of tenure in 
years
Probability of a Going Concern modified 
opinion
The probability of CG opinion 
increases with tenure
Myers, j., Myers, L., and T. 
Omer, 2003 TAR 
P: 1988-2000
S: 42,302 
J: USA
(1) 1-2 years
(2) 3-4 years
(3) Tenure > 5 years
(1) Current accruals
(2) Discretionary accruals (Jones 
model)
Auditors appear to place 
greater constraints on both 
income-increasing and 
income decreasing
accruals as the auditor-client 
relationship lengthens
Audit Tenure and Reporting Quality
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Audit Tenure and Reporting Quality
• The evidence in the previous slide suggests long tenure is “good” in 
the US
• But there is conflicting evidence elsewhere:
• Chi and Huang (2005) find for Taiwanese firms abnormal accruals decline in 
the first years of the audit firm tenure, but increase afterwards
• Chen et al. (2008), also in Taiwan but using different methodologies to 
measure audit quality, fails to document a relation between accruals and 
tenure
• In Belgium Knechel and Vanstraelen (2007) do not find any effect of long 
tenure on the issuance of going-concern opinion
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The European Auditing 
Landscape
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Regulatory Changes in the EU
In the last decade there have been several changes, concerning the following 
spheres of auditors’ work in Europe
• Partner rotations
• Audit firm rotations
• Restrictions on non-audit services (NAS) and fees
• New auditor report
• Limitations and caps to auditor civil liability
I will next describe some of these changes – I believe that these changes 
open up opportunities for research
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Differences Across Member States
• Changes in regulations leave implementation flexibility to a member 
state
• Some examples to follow
• Absent EU regulation there have been differences, such as:
• Disclosing engagement (lead) partner identity 
• See Carcello and Li (2013, TAR) for first time effect of revealing partner identity in the UK
• Requiring audit firm rotations
• Restrictions on the provisions of NAS 
• Single vs. joint audits
• These differences could be investigated to gain new insights
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Partner Rotations
• Required in the EU since 2006
• Flexibility among member states as to the frequency
• UK: 5 years
• Italy: 6 years
• Allowed: 7 years
• Cross-country differences in cooling-off periods
• Under new ISA 700 (effective 12/2016) the name of engagement 
partner should be disclosed 
• This has been the case in Italy for many years
• In the UK this has been required for reports of periods ending from April 2009  
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Mandatory Audit Firm Rotations
25
Source: KPMG
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Mandatory Audit Firm Rotations
First-time adoption:
• If firm tenure > 20 years on 16/6/16 it must be rotated by 17 June 
2020
• If firm tenure > 11 but less than 20 years on 16/6/16, it must be 
rotated by 17/6/2023
• If firm tenure > 2 but less than 11 years on 16/6/16, it must be 
rotated by 
• 17/6/2016 if engagement started before 17/6/2006
• 10 years after beginning of engagement if this is after 16/7/2006
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Restrictions on NAS
• Under new regulation there will be a cap on NAS fees = 70% of audit 
fees (based on a three-year average)
• Many services will be prohibited (from 2016)
• Current practice varies across countries
• For example, in the UK Ethical Standards have strongly discouraged NAS
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New Auditor’s Report
• Following changes in the UK, and International Standards of Auditing, and 
the 2014 EU Regulation, the form and content of the auditor’s report is 
changing in the EU
• In particular, ISA 700 & 701
• But many standards have been recently revised – requires careful analysis
• The EU broadly adopted the ISAs, but member states can make their own 
modifications (will discuss the case in the UK) 
• One innovation concerns the identification and communications of Key 
Audit Matters (KAMs):
“Key audit matters—Those matters that, in the auditor’s professional 
judgment, were of most significance in the audit of the financial statements 
of the current period. Key audit matters are selected from matters 
communicated with those charged with governance.” (ISA 701)
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New Auditor’s Report
• Guidance as to how KAMs should be identified and communicated in the 
new report
• EU regulation now requires the statutory auditor to declare that the 
prohibited non-audit services were not provided and that they remained 
independent of the audited entity in conducting the audit; and
• Indicate any services, in addition to the statutory audit, which were 
provided by the statutory auditor or the audit firm to the audited entity 
and its controlled undertaking(s), and which have not been disclosed in the 
management report or financial statements
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New Auditor’s Report
The UK has gone further with the new auditor’s report already in 2013
• Greater detail is required to be provided about KAMs including a 
summary of the auditor's response to those risks; and where relevant, 
key observations arising with respect to those risks.
• An explanation of how the auditor applied the concept of materiality 
in planning and performing the audit. Such explanation shall specify 
the threshold used by the auditor as being materiality for the 
financial statements as a whole.
• Quite long: See separate Auditor Report for Vodafone 2015
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Limitations and Caps to Auditor Civil Liability
The UK:
• Joint and several liability whereby the deep-pocket auditor may pay 
for other parties’ fault
• Change in the law: “Since 2008 auditors have been permitted, under 
the terms of the Companies Act, to use Liability Limitation 
Agreements (LLAs) to reduce the threat of litigation from clients. LLAs 
are clauses built into the terms of an engagement that impose a cap 
on the amount of compensation that can be sought from the auditor. 
These must be approved by shareholders annually and be upheld by 
judges as ‘fair and reasonable’ when cases arise.” (Source: 
www.accaglobal.com)
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Limitations and Caps to Auditor Civil Liability
The EU (see also 
http://ec.europa.eu/finance/auditing/liability/index_en.htm):
• “In June 2008, the European Commission recommended that member 
states find a way to limit auditor liability to try and encourage competition 
in the audit of listed companies and to protect EU capital markets .” 
(Source: www.accaglobal.com)
• “Since unlimited joint and several liability may deter audit firms and 
networks from entering the international audit market for listed companies 
in the Community, there is little prospect of new audit networks emerging 
which are in a position to conduct statutory audits of such companies”. 
(Commission Recommendation, (2008/473/EC)) 
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Limitations and Caps to Auditor Civil Liability
• Practice varies across member states: UK has adopted limitations. In 
Germany there is a statutory caps of a fixed monetary amount. In 
France, this is disallowed. (Source: ICAEW)
• Australia in 2004 introduced proportionate liability for all claims for 
economic loss. New South Wales has introduced a scheme for 
auditors that caps their liability at 10 times the audit fee for 
substantial audits, subject to a maximum of A$20m. (Source: ICAEW)
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European-specific Studies
• Next I briefly discuss three different studies from France, Sweden and 
Italy
• Each takes advantage of a unique setting 
• André et al. (2016, EAR) explore if the French requirement for joint 
auditors is more costly than one auditor; they further explore if joint 
audits deliver better reporting quality.
• To do so they need observations from other countries where there is 
a single auditor. These are UK and Italy.
• Sample period is 2007-2011 with 210 French companies, 279 UK 
companies and 142 Italian companies   
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André et al. (2016, EAR)
35
Two Big auditors are more 
expensive than one. Possible 
explanations:
1. Collectively they exert 
more effort
2. There is co-ordination cost
3. Better opportunity to 
extract rent
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André et al. (2016, EAR)
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No evidence that, if 
both auditors exert 
more effort than a 
single auditor, audit 
quality improves.
On the other hand, 
no evidence of 
economic bonding 
either.
May reflect an 
inefficient system (or 
protecting labor).
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Zerni et al. (2012, EAR)
• While in France joint audits are prescribed by law, in Sweden client 
firms can voluntary elect to employ joint auditors
• It stands to reason that if client firms choose to do so, this must be 
beneficial in some way; perhaps:
• Negotiate lower fees than under a mandatory regime (not tested) 
• Signalling value – committing to higher audit quality (impossible to use this 
signal when joint audits are required)
• The cost of the signal may be financial (more fees) but also greater scrutiny and less 
reporting flexibility 
• So this setting may speak as to the value of auditing
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Zerni et al. (2012, EAR)
• Zerni et al. (2012) use propensity score matching to control for lack of 
sample randomness and endogeneity problems
• For example, firms that want to borrow may select joint auditors, which then 
can explain why joint audits are associated with lower borrowing costs
• They find evidence in support of signaling
• Joint audits are more expensive
• Joint audits are associated with more conservative accounting 
• Joint audits are associated with higher credit ratings
• Yet, it is not clear that these benefits would extend to mandatory 
joint audits
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Cameran et al. (2015, AJPT)
• Analyse the Italian setting where audit firm rotations were required 
since 1975
• Using proprietary data (2006-09, 667 obs.) they examine the 
behaviour of audit fees, audit hours and abnormal working capital 
accruals around mandatory and voluntary firm rotations
• Firm rotations involve loss of client-specific knowledge, so the 
incoming auditor may need to exert more effort, and at the same 
time, may be more prone to mistakes and client manipulations
• To get the engagement, the incoming auditor may low-ball the fees
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Cameran et al. (2015, AJPT)
40
Low-balling
More hours 
worked (but 
without pay)
Recouping of 
fees
in later years 
(the authors provide 
more evidence on 
this in the paper) 
No EM
TAU 29 November 2016 © Gilad Livne
Suggestions for Future Research
• Identify a unique or unusual feature in the audit market in your home 
country (or elsewhere)
• Discuss with auditors and regulators
• What is the reason for this feature?
• How well does it function?
• Form a research agenda
• Think of the research question
• Assess if you can shed light on an unresolved issue
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Suggestions for Future Research
• Search for unique data
• Example: Amir et al. (2014) got access to auditors’ criminal records in Sweden
• Follow changes in regulations
• EU regulation
• Auditing standards
• Country-specific
• The audit profession will be changing radically and sooner than we may think
• Big data analytics 
• Cross-country variations in adoption
• Employment and education effects
• Demise of the Big players?
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Specific Examples for Future Research
• Transition rules for mandatory firm rotations imply that these 
rotations would take place after a range of tenure years
• Provides an opportunity to assess the efficacy of the rotation rules (is 10 years 
better than 15?)
• Different partner rotation rules (i.e., differences in max tenure) may 
be exploited 
• Partner names will be disclosed more widely - will allow large 
datasets exploration of individual (personal) attributes and their 
effect on audit quality 
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Summary
• The audit research is vast, but still growing
• I believe there are many research opportunities
• Israeli context 
• I hope you have found interesting
• Looking forward to discussing research ideas 
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